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By: Owen Rooney
In Kramer v. Cullinan 878 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir., 2018) the Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of a Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that that the employer’s public statement was not “stigmatizing” and defendant was entitled to qualified immunity.
Plaintiff served in dual roles as Executive Director of Public Radio and a related Foundation. He reported to Southern Oregon University President Cullinan who became concerned that plaintiff was engaged in costly projects and a potential conflict of interest existed in plaintiff serving in both capacities. The University system conducted an asset liability investigation which concluded that the projects could cause a financial strain on the university and that the projects were not aligned with the university’s interests. Plaintiff resisted the university’s efforts to remove him from both roles by trying to have the Board pass resolutions to keep him in both positions. The university president sought advice of counsel who authored a letter urging the Foundation not to adopt plaintiff’s resolutions and also raising the potential liability of plaintiff and the Directors. The letter was given to the Board members prior to voting on plaintiff’s resolutions, a meeting at which the press was present. At the meeting, President Cullinan spoke, again raising the issue of possible legal liability, but expressing hope for an amicable resolution.
Thereafter, plaintiff’s annual appointment was not renewed. Following the grievance procedure, plaintiff filed suit, alleging, among other things, a civil rights violations for deprivation of his liberty without due process. The District Court granted summary judgment as to all claims except the civil rights cause of action. In reversing, the Ninth Circuit held that the letter did not actually impute bad faith, willful or wasteful conduct. Rather, the letter in question stated that “if” plaintiff had engaged in bad faith, willful or wasteful conduct, he would not be entitled to indemnity.
Secondly, the Court recognized that an employer’s statement about an employee may implicate a liberty interest. Thus, an employee charged with fraud, dishonesty or immoral conduct is entitled to a name-clearing hearing under the 14th Amendment. The Court also held that prior legal precedent was not sufficient to put the university president on notice that her conduct violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights because the prior cases did not involve the conditional language at issue here.
The take away is that qualified immunity is still alive in the Ninth Circuit and is applicable in an employment context.
If you have any questions or would like more information please contact Owen Rooney at email@example.com.